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CASE COMMENTS

COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
FORECLOSING ON THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. -, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977)
In contravention of an Arizona State Bar disciplinary rule," appellant attorneys placed a newspaper advertisement listing their fees for certain routine
services at their "legal clinic."2 Disciplinary proceedings led to a recommendation that appellants be suspended from practice for one week.8 On appeal to
the Supreme Court of Arizona, appellants contended that the Bar rule was
overbroad and infringed on their right of free commercial speech 4 under the
first amendment. This argument was rejected by a plurality, which interpreted
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court as not extending the constitutional shelter for commercial speech to advertisements by professionals
rendering services.5 The United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD,
that although restrictions on commercial speech were not voidable for over-

1. DR 2-101(B), Rule 29(A) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 17A ARIZ. Rav.
(1976 Supp.).
2. The advertisement read: DO YOU NEED A LAWYER?

STAT.

26

LEGAL SERVICEs
AT VERY REASONABLE FFm

*Divorce or Legal Separation- Uncontested
(both spouses sign papers):
$175.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
*Preparationof All Court Papersor Instructions
On How to Do Your Own Simple Uncontested Divorce
$100.00
*Adoption - Uncontested Severance Proceeding
$225.00 plus approximately $10 publication cost
*Bankruptcy- Non-Business, No Contested Proceedings
Individual
$250.00 plus $55.00 court filing fee
Wife and Husband
$300.00 plus $110.00 court filing fee
*Change of Name
$95.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
Information regardingother types of cases furnished
on request.
Legal Clinic of Bates & O'Steen
617 North 3rd Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Telephone (602) 252-3883
Arizona Republic, Feb. 22, 1976.
3. The suspensions of each of the clinic's two partners were to run consecutively so that
appellants' law offices need not be dosed.
4. Appellants also contended that DR 2-101(B) violated antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1,2 (1970), by restraining competition between attorneys. In re Bates,
113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), rev'd, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
5. Id. That court also agreed with appellee Arizona State Bar's argument that Sherman
Act provisions were inapplicable to the disciplinary rule under the state action exemption of
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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breadth, G the rule against attorney fee advertising7 as applied, impermissibly
restrained the free flow of information protected by the first amendment. s
Until recently commercial speech had been held to stand outside the protection given by the free speech clause of the first amendment. In early challenges to statutory restrictions, regulatory prerogatives were found to outweigh
the rights of advertisers. 9 In [942, the Supreme Court decided that the Constitution did not protect exclusively commercial speech from government regulation,1° and even during its expansion of first amendment rights to include re-

6. 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2707 (1977). Appellants and several of the amici curiae had argued at
length that DR 2-101(B) was so sweeping in compass that it should be struck down on its face.
Brief of Appellant at 51-54, Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25-35, Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). The Court held that the advertising of fees for
professional services did not deserve the unusually strong protection offered by the doctrine
of overbreadth. See notes 41-56 infra and accompanying text. Evidently the Court's intention
was to prevent recourse to the doctrine in all challenges to commercial speech regulations, for
the narrowing of the doctrine's applicability was justified by a characteristic common to all
commercial advertising, the absence of a significant chilling factor. The language used to
circumscribe the doctrine indicates the Court's intended scope: "T]he justification for the
application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context." 97 S. Ct. at 2707.
7. The Court, limiting its holding to this aspect of attorney solicitation, specifically said
that the decision did not resolve questions of advertisements of the relative quality of legal
services, of radio and television advertising, and of in-person solicitation of clients. 97 S. Ct.
at 2700, 2709. The Supreme Court has recently agreed to review two cases involving the constitutionality of restrictions on "capping" or in-person solicitation. See, Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 49 (1977); In re
Smith, - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 49 (1977). Cf. Goldman v. State
Bar, 20 Cal. 3d 130, 570 P.2d 463, 141 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1977) (holding that the instant case
does not bar state prohibition of solicitation of professional employment by attorneys);
People v. Posner, - Mich. App. -, 261 N.W.2d 209 (1978) (holding statute prohibiting
solicitation of professional employment from accident victims overbroad on its face and
unconstitutional for restricting non-commercial freedom of expression).
8. 97 S. Ct. at 2709. While doubtless the practical effect of the instant decision on the
legal profession will be profound, this comment will focus primarily on the overbreadth aspect
of the opinion. See notes 24-56 infra and accompanying text. For analyses of the instant case's
immediate impact on lawyers, see Supreme Court Holds Lawyers May Advertise, 63 A.B.A.J.
1093 (1977); Lieberman, The ABA Misses the Mark on Advertising, BUsINEss WEEK, Aug. 29,
1977, at 74.
9. See, e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (upholding state power to forbid
billboard advertising of tobacco); rf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (federal statute
prohibiting the mailing of lottery advertisements upheld over first amendment challenge as
a reasonable exercise of the postal power). But see Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138 (1922)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (confirming postmaster's statutory discretion to prohibit mailed advertising of medical nostrums): "If the execution of this law does not abridge freedom of
speech I do not quite see what could be said to do so." Id. at 140. See generally Redish, The
First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial Speech and Free Expression, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971).

10. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1943). The Court upheld a New York City
ordinance prohibiting handbill distribution in the face of an objection that the law disregarded the first amendment. The same ordinance was only recently struck down in light of
current commercial speech decisions. People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 355 N.E.2d 375, 387
N.Y.S.2d 415 (1976).
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ligious and political solicitation" the Court remained intractable with regard
to purely commercial speech.12 In the 1960's, however, constitutional protection
was extended to paid political advertisements of "the highest public interest."'' 8
Recently the Court has used a balancing test 4 to determine whether commercial communications warrant first amendment coverage. Applying this test
to a state prohibition of abortion advertising, the Court held in Bigelow v.
Virginia that the statute violated a newspaper editor's right to commercial
free speech,'6 thereby laying the foundation for a future expansion of constitu7
tional protection in this area.'
11. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. City of Irvington, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
12. See Breard v. Ciiy of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding a municipal ordinance against door-to-door magazine sales).
13. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). An advertisement describing
abuses allegedly committed against civil rights workers in Alabama solicited contributions to
a defense fund for Martin Luther King, Jr. The public interest element, even in allegations
contained in the advertisement that proved to be false, allowed the Court to distinguish the
case from Chrestensen. The fact that it was a paid advertisement did not remove its first
amendment safeguards. Nine years later the Court was again able to avoid resolving the
question of how much protection to give commercial speech. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). In that case a suit against a newspaper
charging sexual discrimination in its classified "Help Wanted" section was brought before
the Court. It was held unnecessary to determine whether the first amendment encompassed
advertising of limited or no public interest since the sexual discrimination was illegal. The
opinion indicated, nonetheless, that there would have been some first amendment protection
absent the supervening illegality. Id. at 389.
14. This test has also been referred to as "harm-weighing," Note, Commercial Speech and
the First Amendment: An Emerging Doctrine, HorrnA L. REv. 655, 665 n.64 (1977); and as
"definitional balancing," Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. Rv. 935, 942-43 (1968); Comment, The
Consumer's Right to Know: New First Amendment Weapon in the War on Price Advertising

Bans, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 354, 360 n.46 (1977). It involves a comparison of the constitutional
interest of the claimant with the likelihood that the challenged statute will achieve desired
state goals.
15. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Jeffrey Bigelow, managing editor of a weekly college newspaper
in Charlottesville, ran the advertisement of a New York abortion referral service. He was
convicted under a Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor to encourage or prompt the
procuring of an abortion by the sale or circulation of any publication. Weighing the state's
interest in protecting its citizens against the first amendment freedoms of both the editor and
the public, the Court held that the statue, as applied to Bigelow, infringed speech that was
constitutionally protected under the first amendment. Id. at 826-29.
16. Id. at 818.
17. The Court consistently declined, however, to extend the scope of first amendment
coverage to broadcast commercial speech, and refused to strike down prohibitions against
cigarette advertising on radio and television. See note 56 infra and accompanying text. Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), afJ'd sub nom, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). This case has been referred to
as the "high-water mark" of the commercial speech exception to the first amendment. See
J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 834 (1975). Whatever
protection the media deserved was held outweighed by Congress' commerce and police
powers, since cigarettes were deemed dangerous to public health. Whether this decision will
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Opinions that sanctioned protection for commercial speech, however,
did not clarify whether constitutional safeguards encompassed only advertising
with a public interest element. The Supreme Court resolved this question in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,",
holding that purely commercial advertising of prescription drug prices fell
within the ambit of the first amendment.1 9 Because the freedom to speak commercially coincided with consumers' related first amendment right to receive
price information 2 0° the state interests involved 2' were held to be outweighed
by the benefits of open channels of communication.2 Although it extended
constitutional safekeeping to exclusively mercantile speech, the opinion observed that commercial expression differs from other kinds of speech, and for
that reason the Court explicitly preserved some state regulatory power over
23
advertising.
stand in the aftermath of later commercial speech cases is ably discussed in a recent article,
Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080
(1976). Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting): "[A]pparently under the Court's holding so
long as the [cigarette] advertisements are not deceptive they may no longer be prohibited."
Id. at 789.
18. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). A drug-dependent individual and two consumers' groups sought
to enjoin the enforcement of a Virginia statute that prohibited the advertisement of prescription drug prices, arguing that the statute burdened their first amendment "right to
know."
19. Id. at 770. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun observed that requiring a
public interest element would be pointless, since one could be added to most commercial
messages with minimum effort. Id. at 764. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)
(commercial exhibitor sought to transform banned handbill by printing political message on
reverse side).
20. 425 U.S. at 757.
21. Interests asserted by the state to justify the prohibition included the maintenance of
professionalism among pharmacists, the dangers of aggressive price competition, and the loss
of a stable professional relationship between pharmacists and their customers. Id. at 766-68.
22. Such an unobstructed stream of data was felt vital to the efficient distribution of resources in a market economy that used as its allocative method the private purchasing
choices of many consumers. fd. at 763-64. One commentator finds this economic thesis
analogous to "the liberal democratic notion of the relationship of free speech to the achievement of optimal political choices." Reich, Consumer Protection and the First Amendment: A
Dilemma for the FTC?, 61 MINN. L. REv. 705, 717 (1977). A less favorable analysis was offered in Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv.
1, 4 (1976).
23. 425 U.S. at 770. Reasonable time, place, and manner limitations exceeding those permitted on political speech were acceptable. Id. at 771. Commercial speech rights, compelled
by necessities of health and of survival in the marketplace, were thought less likely to be
chilled by governmental regulation. Id. at 771-72 n.24. As long as no attempt was made to
regulate the content of advertisements, and while ample alternative channels of communication remained available, government restrictions of commercial speech were tolerable if in
furtherance of legitimate state goals. Id. at 771. The Court has since further sharpened the
parameters of permissible state regulation. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 97 S. Ct.
2010 (1977) (invalidating state restrictions on the advertising and display of contraceptives);
Linmark Ass'n, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977) (striking down ordinances prohibiting the display of "for sale" signs in racially-transitional neighborhoods);
accord, Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, .542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. C. 1679 (1977)
(overruling FTC order banning use of the phrase "instant tax refund" in loan company ad-
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Challenges to limitations of commercial speech often have asserted that the
legislative prohibitions swept farther than was necessary to achieve legitimate
governmental objectives.2 4 The Court has frequently accepted those arguments

and nullified statutes in first amendment suits not involving advertising. In
these noncommercial freedom of speech cases the Court has struck down
overly broad statutes in one of two ways. A statute is held to be invalid in part,
using what has been termed the as-applied method, or in its entirety, by means
of the more comprehensive overbreadth doctrine. 25 The as-applied method is
the more traditional and limited response to statutes that are too widely drawn.
Under this method, brought to bear infrequently in free speech disputes, 26 the
Court will review only the specific fact situation before it and determine
whether the statute was wrongfully applied in that particular instance.27 The
overbreadth doctrine is radically different. It enables the Court, despite a
historic reluctance to void legislation, 28 to hold a statute unconstitutional on
its face. 29 To reach this result, rules of standing must be relaxed and some con-

vertisements); Harris v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 338 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976) (public interest in proscribing debotor harassment outweighted finance company's right to inform debtor's employer
of his obligation prior to final judgment).
24. Several of these cases involved access to legal services, most notably NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963). The Virginia State Conference of NAACP Branches made its staff of
attorneys available at no cost to individuals wishing to take action against racial discrimination. A state law forbade organizations retaining lawyers, in connection with proceedings to
which they were not parties, and in which they had no pecuniary rights or liabilities, to solicit
business for the retained attorneys. The Court agreed with petitioner NAACP that the statute
was overbroad on its face, noting that "the State has failed to advance any substantial xegulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can
justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed ..- " Id. at 444. Cf. United Transp.
Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (statute that prohibited union from
recommending attorneys to members violated members' freedoms of speech and association);
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (injunction of union's employment of an attorney to prosecute members' claims infringed on members' freedom of association); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (court order
halting union's lawyer referrals for injured members abridged members' constitutional freedoms of speech and association). Restrictions on solicitation by professionals were formerly
thought necessary to protect the public. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374
U.S. 424 (1963) (restrictions on optometrists' advertising upheld); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (sale of optical appliances may be prohibited); Semler v. Oregon
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (law proscribing the advertising of dental
services allowed to stand).
25. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Rv.
844 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1974); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405 (1974) (statute forbidding "improper use" of United States flag unconstitutional as applied to appellants superimposition of peace symbol on flag). The as-applied technique is
more commonly used in cases not connected with the Bill of Rights. See The First Amendment OverbreadthDoctrine,supra note 25, at 852 n.31.

27. Note, supranote 25, at 845-52.
28. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
29. The Court has used the overbreadth doctrine in first amendment cases to force a
legislature to rewrite unconstitutional statutes, a much quicker and more forceful approach
than case-by-case examination of the statute.
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jecture permitted;3 ° a statute is examined to determine whether it can be applied unconstitutionally under any conceivable circumstances. If a prohibited
31
application is possible, the statute is struck down. This facial overbreadth
approach often has been favored over the as-applied procedure as a means of
resolving first amendment conflicts. 32 The Court has justified this exceptional
mode of protection by stressing the extraordinary importance of first amend33
ment rights and their vulnerability to chilling by unrestrained legislation.
Consequently, overbreadth methodology has been used almost exclusively to
3 4
nullify statutes that might have chilled freedom of speech.
Nevertheless, the overbreadth doctrine has been severely criticized by some
members of the Court,35 and was recently restricted to challenges of regulations
of pure speech.3 6 The facial overbreadth approach thus is no longer an ade30. It is possible when alleging facial overbreadth to assert the rights of parties not before the Court, even when claimants' own conduct could constitutionally be regulated. The
Court has allowed the assertion of jus tertii so that its remedies can sweep as widely and as
powerfully as the unconstitutional statutes enacted by legislatures do; this exception to the
rules of standing gives the doctrine of overbreadth its prodigious force. See, e.g., City of
Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1967);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii
in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus
Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423 (1974).
31. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1960).
32. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding unconstitutional on its face
a state breach-of-the-peace statute prohibiting fighting words); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1972) (finding a loitering ordinance void for vagueness and overbreadth); United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (nullifying a federal regulation banning members of "Communist-action organizations" from employment in defense facilities, as restrictive of protected
freedom of association); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating as vague and
facially overbroad state subversive-activities statutes restricting the activities of civil rights
organizations); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding that a municipal ordinance
imposing strict liability for possession of obscene materials exercised a sufficient chilling effect
on protected expression to be unconstitutional on its face).
33. "These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). See Note, The Chilling
Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 822-26 (1969).
34. But see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1967) (statute authorizing electronic
eavesdropping held facially overbroad as an invasion of fourth amendment zone of protection); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-17 (1964) (act prohibiting the issue or
renewal of passports to Communist Party members ruled facially overbroad as limitation on
protected fifth amendment right to travel).
35. "The 'overbreadth' and 'vagueness' doctrines, as they are now being applied by the
Court, quietly and steadily have worked their way into First Amendment parlance much as
substantive due process did . . . [Overbreadth is] a doctrine that reduces our function to
parsing words in the context of imaginary events." Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 137-38
(1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 535-37 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 566 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
36. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Broadrick involved a challenge by state
employees to Oklahoma's Hatch Act, which prohibited substantial participation by them in
politics or their solicitation of political contributions. Despite a challenge predicated on the
statute's breadth the Court upheld the Act, subordinating the overbreadth doctrine to the as-
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quate means to assess a statute that regulates only conduct.- Advertising, however, was specifically excluded from that prohibition in the Bigelow case.38
The Court in Bigelow said that advertising is pure speech, not conduct, and
thus falls squarely within the scope of the overbreadth doctrine. 39 Since the
Court in Bigelow sanctioned a challenge to the substantial overbreadth of a
statutory restriction of newspaper advertising~ o it seemed until the present case
that the overbreadth doctrine could be invoked to annul significant restrictions
on commercial speech.41
Declining to follow the views expressed in Bigelow,4 2 however, in the instant case the Court refrained from applying overbreadth analysis. Commercial
advertising, since motivated by economic competition, was found less likely to
be chilled by sweeping statutes than non-mercantile speech 4 3 and not to require the extraordinary protection afforded by the overbreadth doctrine.44 The
tolerance extended to political misstatements was deemed unjustified in commerce because commercial advertisers, unlike political critics, were considered
best able to verify the truthfulness of their own representations and thus deapplied method as a vehicle for challenging regulations of conduct. Id. at 615-16. The opinion
also held that to be successful, a first amendment challenge relying on the doctrine must
prove a substantial degree of overbreadth. This requirement probably was already implicit in
the doctrine. See Note, supra note 25, at 859.
37. The Court, significantly, observed that its limitation of the overbreadth doctrine only
applied in cases where the challenged statute regulated conduct; regulations on "pure speech"
were still subject to overbreadth attacks. 413 U.S. at 615.
38. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Because the Virginia legislature had subsequently amended the
misdemeanor statute under which Bigelow was convicted and fined $500, the issue of its
overbreadth had become moot by the time the case was decided, and the Court therefore
employed the as-applied methodology. The Court made it clear, however, that the challenge
could have been upheld and the statute stricken on its face had no amendment been passed,
and that the state courts had erred in denying Bigelow standing to assert this claim without
determining whether the alleged overbreadth was substantial. Id. at 815-18.
39. id. at 817.
40. Bigelow was distinguishable from Broadrick in four ways: First, a substantial degree
of overbreadth was proven in the Virginia case. Second, the Virginia courts had not narrowed
the scope of the statute that restricted Bigelow; a narrowing construction by the Oklahoma
State Personnel Board had made the degree of the Broadrick statute's overbreadth less substantial. Third, the Oklahoma appellants had attempted to assert the possibility of future

unconstitutional applications of the state's Hatch Act as grounds for its nullification; those
standing problems and problems of hypothetical injury were not present in Bigelow because
a conviction had already been obtained against the newspaper editor. Finally, the Virginia
statute, unlike the Oklahoma one, attempted to regulate pure speech rather than only conduct.
41. 97 S. Ct. at 2708.
42. See note 38 supra.
43. "Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such
speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation." Id. The impact
of this judicial about-face was evidently meant to prohibit overbreadth challenges to all
commercial speech laws, not just those forbidding professional advertising. See note 7 supra.
44. But see Reich, supra note 22, at 716. Professor Reich contends that there is substantial chilling of commercial speech by trade regulations too sweeping in design, such as
the impact of an FTC cease-and-desist order upon an advertiser, that may inhibit the publication of even truthful commercial information.
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termine whether they are within the scope of constitutional protection.4
Overbreadth analysis seemed unsuitable in "a context where it is not necessary
to further its intended objective,"4 6 and the Court held the Arizona Bar's
disciplinary rule unconstitutional only as applied to the advertising of prices
for routine legal services.4

The Court said that the instant case followed a fortiori from Virginia
Pharmacy4s and, as in that opinion, summarily rejected many of the arguments advanced for the regulation. A consumer-oriented balancing test similar
to that in Virginia Pharmacy was used to weigh the arguments in favor of restricting professional advertising against the consequences of removing the
prohibition. 49 The Bar Association's claim that the profession was too philan-

thropic to adapt to competition was dismissed: the Court found this characterization of lawyers as beneficent to be at odds with Bar allegations that
attorneys might mislead clients with unconscionable claims.50 Similarly, the
Court was not persuaded by appellee's contention that the abolition of disciplinary rules like Arizona's would congest courts with litigants, raise fees,
and threaten the quality of counseling; instead, it emphasized that greater
access to the legal system was imperative. 5 1 Also rejected was the Bar's claim
45. 97 S. Ct. at 2707. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72
(1964) (first amendment requires high tolerance of incorrect political statements in newspapers).
46. 97 S.Ct. at 2708.
47. Id. at 2709. As examples of routine legal services the Court mentioned uncontested
divorces and adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies and changes of name. Id. at 2694.
48. Id. at 2700. This balancing test is described elsewhere. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
49. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In that case the Court had hinted at a possible exclusion of fee
advertising by service professionals from the shelter of the first amendment: "Physicians and
lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services
of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion
and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising." Id. at 773 n.25.
50. The majority found it "at least somewhat incongruous" for appellee to praise the
Bar's spirit of public service and to warn in the same breath that attorneys would abuse free
commercial speech. 97 S. Ct. at 2707. Appellee's argument that perception of lawyers as businessmen in search of a profit would cause public suspicion and loss of faith was summarily
dismissed; the Bar's claim that regulation of attorneys' misrepresentations was all but impossible was ignored by placing the burden of enforcement on the Bar. The Court felt that
true professionalism need not exclude the profit motive nor tolerate the duping of clients
through unethical enticement. Id. at 2701. Current disciplinary procedures were considered
sufficient. However, Justice Powell's separate opinion expressed a contrary position. (Powell, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part): "The Court seriously understates the difficulties,
and overestimates the capabilities of the Bar - or indeed of any agency public or private - to
assure with a reasonable degree of effectiveness that price advertising can at the same time be
both unrestrained and truthful." Id. at 2715. See generally ABA Special Committee on
Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (1970).
51. The Court did not find the potential for greater utilization of the courts threatening;
lack of accessibility was already a serious problem. 97 S. Ct. at 2705. See Hearings on "The
Organized Bar: Self-Serving or Serving the Public?" before the Subcommittee on the Representation of Citizens' Interests of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
The notion that advertising would inflate fees by increasing overhead was discredited by
findings that unrestricted advertising of products lowers prices. It seemed reasonable to expect
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that attorney advertising was inherently misleading to the public. 5 2 The fivejustice majority found a great need for increased public disclosure concerning
legal services and said that advertising was most appropriate in the area of
routine rather than unique services, agreeing with appellees that fixed rates
might at times mislead, but placing the duty of supervision on the state bar
associations. 3
Not all state regulation of legal advertising was precluded by the Court's
holding, however. Utilization of the as-applied approach allowed a narrower
ruling; had the Court invalidated the disciplinary rule on its face it would
have remained unclear how much, if any, state regulation of commercial expression would still be permissible.54 The minimal chilling effect of restrictions
on commercial speech, and the weight of legitimate state interests in protecting
the public, permitted some controls 55 As in Virginia Pharmacy, misleading,
the same effect on the advertising of services. See W. CODY, REsmTRIcrED ADVERTISING AND COMPErrrON: THE CASE OF RE.TAm DRUGS (1976). Appellee also contended that publicizing fixed
rates for various services might induce practitioners to prefer minimal, standardized packages
even where more demanding needs existed. The Court commented that slipshod practices
were not discouraged by the current prohibitions on advertising. 97 S. Ct. at 2706 nn.34, 35.
52. As noted previously, the Court said that increased flow of information aids allocative
efficiency. "[W]e view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public
ignorance." Id. at 2704. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of
Florida, in recently enjoining the sale of inexpensive uncontested divorce forms by an Ocala
typist, noted the emphasis on greater access to legal services in the instant case but found
that the typist had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Because of the minimal expertise needed to prepare wills, divorce and bankruptcy forms, the typist had alleged in response to the Bar's suit that Florida lawyers were running unlicensed typing services.
Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, No. 48, 803 (Fla., filed Jan. 10, 1978).
53. Responding to the argument that some clients' needs were not particularized enough
to make advance determination of prices appropriate, the instant Court emphasized that advertising best fitted "routine" legal services, which are more easily standardized than services
of a unique nature. See note 46 supra. The Court added that there could be no misrepresentation if a client's needs were met at the published price. 97 S. Ct. at 2703. See Louisiana
Consumer's League v. Louisiana State Bd. of Optometry Examiners, 557 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1977) (finding a statute prohibiting the advertising of prices for prescription eyeglasses and
optical products an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech because the state could
not show that the process of filling optical prescriptions was so unique that standardized rates
could not be established).
54. The Court was therefore able to outline more fully the extent of constitutionallysound state regulation.
55. 97 S. Ct. at 2707-08. Permissible restrictions on commercial speech thus might vary
considerably from state to state. The Court found this a less worrisome possibility than the
consequences of totally voiding the rule on overbreadth grounds. Id. at 2709 n.37. Local control has been allowed in other areas of expression as well, see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (defamation); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) (obscenity). Indeed, some variation among the states in their regulation of lawyers' advertising
may already be detected. Recently the ABA's House of Delegates proposed that the Code of
Professional Responsibility be amended to permit legal advertising on radio. House of
Delegates Adopts Advertising D.R., 63 A.B.A.J. 1234, 1235 (1977). However, a special committee of the Florida Bar recommended against radio or television commercials by lawyers and
for the initiation of grievance proceedings against several Florida attorneys engaged in advertising. Florida Bar News, Sept. 10, 1977, at 3. Accord, Talsky v. Department of Registration and Educ., 68 Ill. 2d 579, 370 N.E.2d 173 (1977); In re Madsen, 68 Ill. 2d 472, 370 N.E.2d
199 (1977).
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false, and deceptive advertisements could be subjected to restraints. Time,
place, and manner of advertising could be overseen as well, 56 and it was
acknowledged that radio and television advertising posed unique problems
that might warrant stricter regulation57
The instant Court's refusal to apply overbreadth analysis seems appropriate,
although in sharp contrast to its attitude in Bigelow. Findings of facial overbreadth can be justified only if a great need to protect constitutional rights
exiSts. 58 They are an exceptional means of safeguarding first amendment freedoms, and the withholding of overbreadth protection in the instant case indicates that in the Court's judgment commercial expression still merits a lower
status than political and religious speech. 59 While the lack of a significant
chilling factor was cited by the Court in support of its conclusion,60 it is

possible that other, unarticulated grounds influenced the justices. One consideration that might have silently buttressed the instant decision was the
possibility of erroneous decisonmaking when the rights of absent parties are
asserted via the overbreadth doctrine. 61 Frequently, claimants whose speech
may constitutionally be regulated will urge the invalidation of a statute because it might be applied in violation of the first amendment rights of third
parties in hypothetical situations. 62 As the fact situations presented become
more conjectural, the likelihood increases that statutes will be nullified for
violations that might never materialize.63 That uncertainty was eliminated by
the Court's decision to examine advertising regulations only as they were in
fact applied.

64

56. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (limiting proximity of
adult theatres to residential areas or other adult theatres); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972) (ban on willful disturbances on grounds adjacent to schools); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
77 (1949) (limiting the use of sound trucks).

57. 97 S. Ct. at 2709. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969):
"[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them." Id. at 386. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. The holdings of Virginia Pharmacy and the instant case, however, may indicate a coming alteration of
media regulations, as evidenced by a recent case in the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia. Home Box Office v. FCC, 40 RAn. REG. 2d (P-H) 283 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 75-2130
(D.C. Cir. March 25), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3216 (Oct. 4, 1977). (Striking down FCC rules
restricting advertising and programming on pay cable television as inconsistent with first
amendment protection of commercial speech).
58. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
59. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2707. Contra, Reich, supra note 22.
61. While appellants' brief did not speculate on unconstitutional future applications of
the disciplinary rule, such hypothetical claims may be brought when invoking the overbreadth
doctrine. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
62. The Court had indicated in both the Broadrick and the Bigelow opinions that the
jus tertii possibilities were a major problem with the doctrine. See generally Sedler, supra
note 30.
63. The risk of uncertainty is equally present, of course, in any sort of facial review. See,
e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
64. A recent Illinois Supreme Court case illustrates the impact of the instant decision. A
chiropractor, disciplined for advertising his services in violation of that state's Medical
Practice Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, §16(13) (1973), challenged the statute as an encroachment
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Had the instant Court applied overbreadth methodology to commercial
speech, many of the rules which regulate trade would have stood in constitutional jeopardy.65 One of the many possibilities was presented to the Court in
the amicus curiae brief of the American Bar Association, 6 which expressed
concern that future overbreadth challenges, if permitted, might overturn important federal and state restrictions on the advertising of registered securities. 67 Many of these regulations seem overbroad in that they prohibit advertisements that are neither false, deceptive, nor misleading, without leaving
open the "ample alternative channels" of communication required.6s For example, a newspaper advertisement by a shareholders' group urging greater
participation by holders at company meetings might become the subject of a
first amendment controversy. 69 The advertisement would probably violate
Securities and Exchange Commission rules regulating proxy solicitation if
unregistered prior to publication, even though it might not be misleading or
deceptive.70
on his freedom of speech. The chiropractor argued that even if his activities could constitutionally be regulated the Act was void on its face, because it could be applied to advertisements by third parties that were protected by the first amendment. Relying on the instant
case, the Illinois Supreme Court, while agreeing that the statute was overbroad, held that it
was not voidable on that basis and must be judged only as applied to the chiropractor's advertisements. The Court found no infringement of his freedom of speech, and the overbroad
act was allowed to stand. Talsky v. Department of Registration and Educ., 68 Ill. 2d 579, 370
NE.2d 173 (1977).
65. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Guides and Trade Practice Rules, 16 C.F.R.
§§17-259 (1977). There also may be a substantial chilling effect on the free flow of information as a result of governmental regulation of public corporate elections. See Note, Freedom
of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. Ry. 1191, 1205-06 (1965).
66. Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 31-38, Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
67. See, e.g., Securities Act of 193, 15 U.S.C. §77(e) (1970).
68. See note 23 supra.
69. In 1966 a number of advertisements were placed in The New York Times and other
newspapers by Telephone Shareowners Committee, Inc., a group of AT&T stockholders. The
ads criticized an FCC investigation of AT&T's interstate rates, blaming it for a $7 billion dedine in the market value of the stock, and solicited new members. The SEC twice sent ceaseand-desist orders to the organization, but it refused to stop running the advertisements. The
shareholders claimed that an injunction of their advertising would infringe on their freedom
of speech. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 28, 1966, at 10, col. 2. The conflict between SEC registration requirements, which provide the only means by which the Commission can prevent
illegal statements prior to publication, and the first amendment right of corporate shareholders to the free flow of information has yet to be resolved since that right was recognized
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
70. If commercial speech is entitled to some first amendment protection, it may be that
the SEC's registration requirement for proxy solicitation imposes an unconstitutional prior
restraint on commercial speech, now that the commercial speech exception has been invalidated. Cf. Note, Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation of Proxy Contests, 69 HARv.
L. Ray. 1462, 1472-74 (1956) (which in an apologia for the registration requirements justified
them in part because commercial speech at that time was not protected by the first amendment). But see Kupiec v. Republic Fed. Say. k Loan Ass'n, 512 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1975) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board's restriction of proxy solicitations by association members was
only a slight and incidental infringement of plaintiffs' alleged first amendment freedoms).
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